Scientific freedom and security: striking a balance

Much of science is done for the benefit of society, whether this is medical advances or research into agricultural productivity. Our increased knowledge, however, comes with the risk that it will be misused. Here we ask – what can we do now to make science serve society, not act to destroy it?

So called ‘dual-use’ research, beneficial technology with the potential for misuse, was the topic of a debate at the Society of Biology in London last month.

Advances in genetic technologies, open access research and amateur science groups have great potential to benefit the biosciences, but we need to address the risks that come with them. As part of the Society of Biology Policy Lates discussion series, an expert panel discussed how to minimise the risk of bioscience translating into bioweapons.

This is an emotive topic with fears about threats to security, and conversely, threats to the freedom of science. The importance of access to research is widely acknowledged, yet there have been suggestions that publication of dual-use research should be restricted.

Recent controversy has highlighted the potential to misuse information from genetic research on pathogens. A synthetic pathogen, such as genetically modified bird flu, could feasibly cause a pandemic. This high-profile case is just one of many examples of research which has the potential for misuse.

We would be wrong to think that the risks are limited to microbiology; many biological systems are being manipulated by humans. Our immune, neurological and endocrine systems are all vulnerable to disruption, and fields ranging from neuroscience to nanotechnology now have exciting, but potentially risky applications.

The threat is also by no means limited to biological weapons. Technologies for uranium enrichment could be used in nuclear weapons, and performance-enhancing drugs are open to abuse.

Last year, two papers on influenza were published in their full form after originally being denied publication because of fears about misuse. This raised two questions: should this type of research be done, and should the results be shared?

All recorded influenza pandemics have originated in animals, but so far H5N1 ‘birdflu’ is unable to pass between humans. However, Herfst et al. genetically modified the virus to pass between ferrets in order to test the possibility that H5N1 could acquire this ability under natural conditions, and so give rise to a pandemic. In 2012, this research was published in Science, and was surrounded by controversy.

There were questions over how valuable this research was, but the knowledge that mutations could allow airborne transmission informs us that research into pandemic prevention and control is money well spent and could even aid vaccine development and surveillance. Publication of the research in full provided researchers with valuable information including the level of transmissibility.

At the event, Professor Wendy Barclay, chair in influenza at Imperial College London, argued that the benefits of uncensored scientific information in improving vaccines and surveillance against pandemics far outweighed the current risks. She also raised the question of whether the likelihood of misuse is really that high due to the complexity of the science and existing security measures.

One community set to benefit from open access data is amateur scientists. US journalist Daniel Gruskin, co-founder of New York’s Genspace community biolab, gave an impressive account of what can be achieved in community labs. His recent survey suggests most were doing low-risk bioscience for educational purposes, largely in community spaces with good supervision and safety practices.

Daniel said the risks posed by the DIYbio community had been overstated, and fellow panel member Dr Catherine Jefferson from King’s College London agreed. She said: “The link between the skill to create bioweapons and the actual projects being conducted by biohackers is frequently overstated. People overlook the extent to which a culture of responsibility and accountability has been fostered in the community.”

It is not knowledge that is the problem; it is malintent, whether this comes from within the scientific community or beyond it.

Another common misconception is that amateur biology normally takes place in garages and kitchens; in reality, community labs are growing rapidly. In 2008, DIYbio.org was founded to establish a productive and safe community of DIY biologists, with the belief that biotechnology and greater public understanding has the potential to benefit everyone.

They have recently developed a DIYbio Draft Code of Ethics, and the European code covers dual-use technology with statements such as ‘biotechnology must only be used for peaceful purposes’ and ‘remain accountable for your actions’.

Catherine said: “Initiatives such as this are an important step towards promoting best practice and in fact demonstrate a greater willingness among the amateur biology community to engage on these issues than typically found in the professional science community.

“Yet concern remains as to the effectiveness of relying solely on self-governance measures. But if self-governance is not sufficient, restricting biohacking activity is not an acceptable alternative. Any attempts to unduly limit the freedom of amateur biologists could drive what is currently an open and engaged community into an ‘underground activity’. Further open dialogue should be encouraged, not stifled.”

standing beside a bomb crater is a bad time to exchange business cards. We need to build relationships now to allow science and security communities to work together

Censoring data and restricting publication could potentially prevent society gaining the maximum benefit from scientific research. But how do we minimise the risks without reducing the benefits?

As panel member Dr Piers Millet, Deputy Head of the UN Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, was keen to stress, standing beside a bomb crater is a bad time to exchange business cards. We need to build relationships now to allow science and security communities to work together.

Piers said: “One of my pet peeves is that science and security interests are mutually exclusive. I do not think they are. In fact, I know they are not because for several years I have been working closely with synthetic biologists and bioengineers in three different policy settings.”

“These collaborations have expanded from exchanges of information to collaborative work at a practical level.”

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) brings together synthetic biologists and policy advisors, to help the policy makers understand the realities of the science and its possible benefits. When the BWC has considered the implications of synthetic biology, its reviews are transmitted back to synthetic biologists.

Piers said: “The input from these scientists directly influenced the outcome of a large, high level Chemical Weapons Convention review conference earlier this year (which was opened by the UN Secretary-General himself), creating international policy which explicitly embraces working more closely with partners in science and industry.”

Governments have a role to play in preventing misuse of bioscience, putting in place rules and regulations which ensure it is illegal to use biology as a weapon.

Piers called for the security community to be more data driven, to provide scientists with the evidence that dual usage can be a problem.

A representative from the FBI at the event was keen to stress that we are not all part of the problem; we are part of the solution. Experts are well placed to notice and report any possible problems. Tools and knowledge from the scientific community will be of use to the security community.

Catherine, who also acts as a freelance consultant on bioweapons policy, highlighted the need to educate scientists about dual-use issues. Interestingly, she proposed that professional scientists could learn from the DIYbio community’s strong willingness to engage with security agencies and develop their own code of conduct.

The debate ended on the positive note that, like security, much of science is done to protect society, so there is common ground to stand on. Scientists and policy makers are already working together on this issue, and the evening ended on the positive note that this engagement will strengthen.

The chair, Professor Malcolm Dando FSB, closed the event saying that, although there are currently few issues of dual-use concern at the high-tech level, this is likely to grow. He expressed a hope that this meeting was the start of a growing relationship between the security community and members of the Society of Biology.

BBSRC Policy Fellow Paul Richards, who organised the event at the Society of Biology, concluded: “It is important for scientists and policy makers to work together on these issues now, but we should never lose sight of the great benefits science contributes to society, even if risks and uncertainties are inevitable.”

The Author: Dr Rebecca Nesbit of the Society of Biology